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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of 
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended and 78-2-2(4) (1953) as amended. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Plaintiff failed to 
strictly comply with the Notice of Claim Provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. This issue is preserved by Plaintiffs motion in opposition to the 
State's motion to dismiss and oral arguments made at the hearing on the motion. R. at 
40-60 (opposition motion) and R. at 114 (hearing transcript). 
Standard of Review: A District Court's dismissal of a case based on 
governmental immunity is a determination of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Hall v. Utah State Dept. OfCorr., 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a). Claim for injury—Notice—Contents-
Service—Legal disability. 
(a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed-Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the 
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laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance 
between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same 
matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This is an appeal from the District Court's 
dismissal of the State of Utah for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The case against Magna Investments & 
Development is currently pending and in the process of discovery. 
B. * Course of proceedings and disposition in the court below. 
The Plaintiff filed her complaint in this case on January 9, 2003, seeking damages 
against the State of Utah and Magna Investments & Development for injuries she 
sustained when she slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk in 
front of a Utah State Liquor Store. R. at 1-7. In short, Plaintiff alleged that 
Defendants were negligent in the maintenance of the property, negligent in the 
construction of the water drainage system, negligent in removing ice that had 
accumulated on the sidewalk, and due to Defendants negligence, Plaintiff suffered 
injuries. R. at 1-7. Before answering Plaintiffs complaint, on January 22, 2003, the 
State of Utah filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiff failed to comply with the 
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notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. R. at 16-18. In their 
motion, the State claimed that Plaintiff did not include a sufficient "brief statement of 
facts" as required by the Act. R. at 17. Although the notice of claim stated that the 
fall occurred "in front of a Utah State Liquor Store," the State claimed that the notice 
was insufficient because it failed to specify the exact address of the liquor store where 
Plaintiff was injured. See generally, State's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, R. at 19-39. 
In opposition to the State's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an opposition motion 
and memorandum in support of her motion in opposition. R. at 40-60. The State 
filed a response to Plaintiffs opposition. R. at 61-68. A hearing was held in front of 
the Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson on May 12,2003. See Transcript of Hearing 
R. at 114. At the hearing Judge Hanson heard arguments from both parties and 
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to strictly comply with the Governmental Immunity 
Act. R. at 77-81 (Order Granting State's Motion to Dismiss attached as addendum 
A). In the order granting the State's motion to dismiss, signed May 27, 2003, the 
Judge specifically held as a matter of law that: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) of the Act required claimant to 
have included a "brief statement of facts" relating to the Accident in her 
Notice of Claim. 
2. The Act does not explicitly identify which facts are to be included; 
accordingly, this Court must look to the purpose of the Act to determine 
what facts should be included in a Notice of Claim. 
3. According to the Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to 
provide the State with "an opportunity to correct the condition that 
caused the injury," and to "evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the 
matter without expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 
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42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201, 1204 (Utah 1999). 
4. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, this Court 
concludes that the Notice of Claim, in a slip and fall case such as this, 
must identify the location of the accident. In this case, claimant should 
have provided the address of the liquor store at issue; her reference to an 
unidentified Utah State Liquor store did not provide the State with the 
location of the Accident. 
5. Therefore, the claimant failed to comply with the Notice of Claim 
provision of the Act, and so this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs claim against the State. Accordingly, the State of Utah 
should be dismissed from this case. 
6. The court further concludes that although the State may have had actual 
notice of the location of the Accident from other correspondence sent by 
plaintiffs counsel, the court will not consider such extrinsic evidence 
because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to comply with 
the notice of the claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete 
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
977 P.2d 1201,1204 (Utah 1999). 
R. at 79-81 (Order Granting State's motion to dismiss). After granting the State's 
motion to dismiss the Judge certified the issue and entered Final Judgment in 
favor of the State pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). R. at 81 and R. 
at 86-87. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal with the court on June 16, 2003. R. at 
91-92 (attached as addendum B). 
C. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
Ms. Peeples slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on a sidewalk outside 
of a Utah State Liquor store on December 5, 2001. R. at 59. After Ms. Peeples fell, 
she provided the State with documents regarding the nature of her claim. R. at 51, 52-
4 and 55-8. Specifically, Ms. Peeples sent the State Risk Management Department a 
letter on March 12, 2002 stating the date of the accident, the exact address of where 
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the accident occurred, and information about what condition caused the accident. R. at 
51, (Attached as addendum C). On June 17,2002, Plaintiff again sent State Risk 
Management a letter outlining Ms. Peeple's injuries in more detail, enclosed with the 
letter was a "brochure" that included a summary of the accident, all Plaintiffs 
medical bills to date, a report from the Ambulance company containing the location of 
the liquor store, and other reports and information relevant to her claim. R. at 52-4 
and 55-8, (Attached as addendum D, letter to Risk Management and E, ambulance 
report). Subsequent to the brochure and letters being sent to State Risk Management, 
on September 18, 2002, Ms. Peeples filed her notice of claim by sending it to Utah 
State Risk Management, the Utah Attorney General, and the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. R. at 59-60. "There[] [is] no dispute that [the notice of claim] was filed 
timely and upon the right person/5 R. at 114:p. 3 line 21-22. 
The notice of claim that was properly filed contained a statement of facts that 
included the fact that the accident occurred at a Utah State Liquor Store; it briefly 
stated when the accident occurred; it outlined how the accident occurred; it described 
Plaintiffs injuries; and, it alleged that the State of Utah's negligence caused 
Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 59-60. With regard to the exact location of the accident, 
Plaintiffs notice did not give the address of the Utah State Liquor Store. See, R. at 
Id. Although the notice of claim did not have the address of the accident, other 
correspondence sent to State Risk Management prior to the Notice of Claim being 
sent, informed State Risk Management at which store the accident occurred. See, R. at 
51, 52-4, and 55-8. 
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At the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and in the State's pleadings, the 
State conceded they had actual knowledge of the address of the liquor store. R. at 66 
and 114:p. 10 line 3-4. Despite the fact that the State had actual knowledge of the 
address, the trial judge refused to consider this "extrinsic" evidence to determine 
whether Plaintiffs notice fulfilled the purposes of the Act and gave the State adequate 
information "'to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and 
to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of 
public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" R. at 80: f 6 and Wills v. 
Heber Valley Historic Railroad Auth., 2003 UT 45 at \ 6, 485 Utah Adv. Rep.23 
(quoting Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980)). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The Plaintiff did, in fact, strictly comply with provisions in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. As required by the Act, Plaintiffs notice of claim 
included a "brief statement of the facts." Additionally, the District court erred by 
requiring Plaintiff to include facts in her notice that are not required by the Act. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REASONABLE. 
Due to ambiguities in the Act, this Court should liberally construe the Act with 
a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice by holding that 
Plaintiffs notice was reasonable. In this case, the statute merely states that a claimant 
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shall give a "brief statement of the facts." Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). 
This language in the statute is void of any guidance regarding what facts are 
important, necessary, material, or relevant. Therefore, liberally construing the 
Governmental Immunity Act and promoting justice, Plaintiffs notice of claim was 
reasonable. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REASONABLE 
AND CONGRUENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE 
OF THE ACT. 
Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable and congruent with the purpose of 
the Act because it provided enough information "'to afford the responsible public 
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of 
a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the 
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.5" Wills at f 6 
(quoting Stahl at 482). In this case, the statute merely states that a claimant shall give 
a "brief statement of the facts." Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and congruent with 
the purpose and objective of the act because her notice provided the State more than 
enough information to "pursue a proper and timely investigation." Id. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO CONSIDER 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPER. 
The District Court erred when it failed to consider extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable, whether it was 
congruent with the purpose and objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or 
whether the notice strictly complied with the Act. To determine if the notice of claim 
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has sufficient facts "'to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to 
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim/" the trial court 
should consider whether or not the information did in fact provide enough information 
to conduct a meaningful investigation. Wills at 16. Moreover, where there is 
ambiguity in the Act, the trial court should consider extrinsic evidence and actual 
knowledge when making its decision. Therefore, where there is ambiguity in the Act, 
the consideration of extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine if the notice of claim 
was reasonable, whether it provided enough information to conduct an investigation, 
or whether Plaintiff strictly complied. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Plaintiff did, in fact, strictly comply with the provisions contained in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("the Act"), contrary to the trial court judge's ruling. As 
required by the Act, Plaintiffs notice of claim included a "brief statement of the 
facts." Additionally, the District court erred by requiring Plaintiff to include facts in 
her notice that are not required by the Act. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
requires that the Plaintiffs notice "shall set forth: (i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) 
the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known..." Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l((3)(a) (1997)(as amended). 
At issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs notice complied with the Act by providing 
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"brief statement of the facts." (a copy of the notice is attached as addendum F). As 
required, Plaintiff included a brief statement of facts relating to her accident in her 
notice of claim. R. at 59-60. In their motion and at the motion hearing, the State 
argued that Plaintiffs notice was insufficient because it did not include the address of 
the Utah State Liquor store where the accident occurred. R. at 114:p. 4 line 10-14 and 
R. at 17. In opposition to the State's position, Plaintiff argued that she did comply 
with the requirements of the Act by including a "brief statement of the facts." R. at 
114:p. 10 line 13-16. At the conclusion of the motion hearing in this case, the trial 
court judge took into consideration the purpose of the Act, which he interpreted to be 
correct, and ruled that "in a slip and fall case such as this, [the Plaintiff] must identify 
the location of the accident." R. at 80:14. 
It is the Plaintiffs position that she did comply with the the Act when she 
included a brief statement of the facts. Moreover, it was improper for the trial court to 
compel the Plaintiff to include the address which is not required by the Act. Here, the 
Act is void of any factual requirements. There is no necessity that Plaintiff even 
include material facts. 
In Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, the plaintiff sued a doctor for 
medical malpractice who was employed by the University of Utah, a State institution. 
In order to comply with the Act for filing a malpractice action, Nunez filed a notice of 
claim with the doctor and the Utah Attorney General. Id. at f 3. The doctor filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing he was immune from suit as an employee of 
the University. Id. at f 5. Nunez moved to amend her complaint to include the 
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University as a defendant, but the trial court refused to allow the amendment because 
Nunez allegedly failed to comply with the Act by not serving the notice on the 
University. Id. at f 6. Overruling the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the 
trial judge erred because the notice of claim complied with the Act, which did not 
necessitate the University of Utah or its medical school to be separately named. Id. at 
f23-27. 
In this case, and like the Nunez case, because the Act simply requires a "brief 
statement of facts," Plaintiff complied with the plain language of the Act. The Act 
only requires a "brief statement of the facts," and to compel anything more is 
improper. Specifically, to require that Plaintiff include material facts would be error 
because the plain language of the Act does not necessitate it, on the same token, it is 
improper for the trial court to require facts that are not called for by the Act. When 
the trial court held that the Plaintiff "must identify the location of the accident," it was 
an error that constituted an application of a higher standeird which is not required by 
the Act. It may be characterized that the trial court applied a standard of "perfect 
compliance" in violation of the plain language of the Act. See, R. at 80: f4. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and hold that because Plaintiff 
included a "brief statement of the facts," she thereby complied with requirements of 
the Act. 
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A. PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN HER NOTICE OF 
CLAIM WAS REASONABLE 
Due to ambiguities in the statute, Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and 
congruent with the purpose of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In this case, the 
statute merely states that a claimant shall give a "brief statement of the facts." Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). This language in the statute is void of any 
guidance regarding what facts are important, necessary, material, or relevant. 
Because of the ambiguity and lack of guidance, this Court may hold that the statute is 
vague and ambiguous. In this case, principles of fairness and equity necessitate that 
the Act be liberally construed and interpreted reasonably. In other jurisdictions, it has 
been held that notice provisions such as the one at issue in this case are in derogation 
of the common law and, therefore, such statutes must be strictly construed. See, e.g., 
Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497,498 (Ind. 1989); H. Winter Metal Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 493 N.E.2d 93 (111. App. 1986). 
In Utah, however, statutes in derogation of the common law are treated 
differently: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a 
view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever 
there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law 
in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. Moreover, in Ringwood v. State, the Utah Supreme court 
addressed this statute and how ambiguous statutes should be interpreted by stating: 
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We remain aware of the requirements of our law that our statutes are to be 
given a liberal interpretation to effectuate their purposes. That having been 
said, however, it must also be recognized that where a statute charges one with 
a duty or imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so with sufficient clarity 
and definiteness that one of ordinary intelligence will understand what he is 
required to do. And in case of alternative choices, he can comply by selecting 
the one which is the least burdensome or least offensive to him. 
333 P.2d 943, 944 (Utah 1959) (footnote citations omitted). 
In addition to liberally construing statutes, in cases of first impression like the 
present1, the Utah Supreme Court in an early case citing the original and almost 
exactly worded statute, stated that a court must give "full force and effect" to the 
concept of liberal interpretation found in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. Houston Real 
Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64,138 P. 1159,1161 (Utah 1914). 
Therefore, while the plain meaning of statute must not be ignored, Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2 makes mandatory the requirement that the statute be liberally construed 
with a view to effecting the objects of the statute and to promotes justice. Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1373 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, for example, in construing 
Utah's wrongful death statute, the Supreme Court, citing section 68-3-2, has declined 
to limit damages to pecuniary losses which were not expressly authorized by statute. 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). Similarly, in 
garnishment proceedings, the Supreme Court has cited section 68-3-2 in holding that 
the statutes and rules governing such proceedings must be "liberally construed with 
the object of promoting justice so that both sides to the controversy may have a fair 
1
 Plaintiffs counsel has searched cases in Utah and has been unable to find a case in 
which the court has analyzed what constitutes a reasonable or sufficient "brief 
statement of facts." 
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opportunity to present their claims on the merits." Remington Rand, Inc. v. O 'Neil, 
309 P.2d 368, 370 (Utah 1957). In each of these cases, the Court has applied a rule of 
reason and liberal construction to the statutes under consideration. 
In this case, the statute is void of any guidance as to what facts are required. 
The statute simply requires that the Plaintiff submit a "brief statement of facts." Here, 
Plaintiff submitted a statement of the facts as the Act compels and because she was 
without notice that "in a slip and fall case such as this, [Plaintiff] must identify the 
location of the accident," it would be inequitable, unfair and unreasonable to uphold 
the trial court's ruling. R. at 80: f 4. Moreover, to enforce a standard higher than the 
one found in the statute by requiring Plaintiff to include facts not mandated by the 
statute would be equally unfair. Because Plaintiff was without proper notice, her 
notice of claim was reasonable and this Court should "liberally construe[] [the Act in 
this case] with the object of promoting justice so that both sides to the controversy 
may have a fair opportunity to present their claims on the merits." Remington Rand, 
Inc. at 370. Therefore, this Court should hold that Plaintiffs notice of claim was 
reasonable under the circumstances and reverse the trial courts decision. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE WAS REASONABLE AND 
CONGRUENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE 
ACT. 
Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and congruent with the purpose and objective 
of the act because it provided enough information "'to afford the responsible public 
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of 
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a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the 
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" Wills at f 6 
(quoting Stahl at 482). As noted above, the Act only requires a "brief statement of the 
facts" and this language in the statute is without any guidance regarding what facts are 
important, necessary, material, or relevant. Because of the ambiguity and lack of 
guidance, this Court may hold that the statute is vague and ambiguous. In addition to 
principles of fairness and equity outlined above, when a statute is vague or 
ambiguous, courts will "look . . . to traditional methods of statutory construction. 
Preeminent among these principles is that any proposed interpretation of a statute 
must be compatible with its purpose and objective Wills at f 5 (citing O 'Keefe v. 
Utah State Ret Bd., 956 P.2d 279,280 (Utah 1998)). 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling in this case, the purpose of the Act is very 
broad and in some cases less than strict compliance may be proper because of 
ambiguities in the Act. Although there is no case holding that "reasonable 
compliance" or "sufficient compliance" is enough, there is authority for "allowing 
less than strict compliance . . . in cases which depended on ambiguities in the Act." 
There are at least two cases where the Supreme Court may have allowed 
something "less than strict compliance." The first case is Larson v. Park City Mun. 
Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998). In Larson, Ms. Larson was injured in a bicycle 
accident that occurred on land owned by Park City Municipal Corporation. Id. at 343. 
2
 Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, f7, 69 P.2d 1287 (citing Larson v. Park 
CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (allowing [a] claim where [the] 
statute was unclear as to where notice was to be filed)). 
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Because Park City Municipal Corpoi ation is a governmental entity, Larson filed a 
i • A ,ar. Rules of Civ il Procedure, 
governing service of process upon an incorporate J 
the county recorder and not the "governing body" as required by the Act. la. u. -^4 r. 
*. • - . *. . because Larson did not serve fee notice on the 
"governing K«*-k." A/, at 34*t. me r.v dilate com! i Ms iinalysis obsn'vn.1 ILII llu 
statute on ho w the notice is filed u iih a governing body was unclear. Id. at 346. On 
appeal Lai son pi - •  ,;nui anu inc supreme ( * -u» i held that where the statute is not 
clear, "the filing ol a r.rtice of o! \ • - I It all, < inveinmrnlal Imimiml y 
Act upon the governing bodv of a third class city is satisfied by filing such a notice of 
c . ty recordsi ahua k.an>uit i SK . JU ~1nr~: ~ith the i^tv recorder of 
ParkCit - '*• ' .i, Il \ 
Legislature clarified the ambiguities it 'the Act in the 1998 amendments. Gurule v. 
Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25,1 7, 69 P.3d 1287. • , ' v ' ' 
The scvond i asr v„ licit; (he Supreme < "ouil iii.i"V Ii.rvi!111 .ilttnvetl less than than' 
"strict compliance" is Moreno v. Board of Education. 926 P.2d 886 (I Itah MM)!" ) In 
Moreno, the case''involved the drowning of a boy named Bill in a s\\ immp A 
OAMicd and opemlnl 1^  Ionian ^V'"»'>! I >•« | ?jto at 88 7 St • - -. .ears odore, 
the Morenos u ere ;r\ arded permanent custody and guardianship oi oili 
parental i igm.- wi Bill's natural mother, Laura Bartlett, were never terminated. Id. 
i'Villcn «• • *< • • . . . . „, i. n \lien own bend:",, 
seeking to recover dan\'m<w for the wrongful 1r j! 
Immunity Act. Id. The school district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
Morenos could not maintain their wrongful death action because they were Bill's 
guardians, not his heirs. Id, The trial court denied the school district's summary 
judgment motion, ruling that the Morenos could bring the action on their own behalf. 
The court also denied Bartlett's motion to intervene, ruling that the Morenos were the 
real party in interest. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, held that the Immunity Act gave the 
Morenos the right to bring a wrongful death action but only "in behalf of the ward's 
heirs," Bill's natural mother, Bartlett. Id. at 889-90. Despite her failure to file a 
notice of claim, the Supreme Court allowed Bartlett to "piggyback" on the Morenos' 
notice and intervene in the action they filed. Id. at 892. Overlooking the technical 
defect in the notice of claim, the Court found that the notice of the facts surrounding 
the claim, the nature of the claim, and the amount of damages that would be sought 
and was "legally sufficient to support the maintenance of [Bartlett's] wrongful death 
action." Id. (emphasis added). 
Like the Larson and Moreno cases, this case presents a situation where the 
State has argued and the trial court has held that Plaintiffs notice was not sufficient 
and was not congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. Specifically, in the 
State's reply memorandum to Plaintiffs opposition motion, the State argued that 
Plaintiffs notice was not sufficient and the purpose of the Act is "twofold: both to 
provide the State 'an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, [and] 
16 
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 ; . .' - . •. 
In response to the State's position, Plaintiff argued in the hearing that her 
notice was sufficient and the purpose of the act is a much broader issue than just an 
o 
1
 x4:p. 13 line 14 1 7 and p.14 line 18-24. In addition to arguing that the purpose of 
the Act is broader issue, Plaintiff also read to the court the purpose of the Act that was 
Plaint iffs argument that the purpose is more broad than the one cited by the State, the 
trial court agreed wi th the State's limited .purpose. R at 8 0 : 1 4 . Citing Pigs Gun 
County, 1999 UT 36, 977 P.2d 1201,1204 (Utah 1999), 'the trial court held that 
"according to.the Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to provide tit; i 
Sink1 Willi "".ill ippnilmiily hi IOIIWI (lie condition llial caused the injur) , and to 
"evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without expense of litigation." R. at 
80: f 6. 
A case thai addressed the scope ol (he purpose ami objective ol the ,' \t 1 is ll'i'i i "i 
v Heber Valley Historic Railroad Autk. In Wills, the Supreme Court held that the 
motorists ' notice of claim was proper under the Act when they sent their notice of 
The purpose found in the Nunez opinion was a quote from the Stahl case. ~T Tx~1~ 
Supreme Court case decided in 1980, More recently the Supreme Cour t , ; 
recent opinion reaffirmed and cited their statement of the purpose •'•*" 'he j a 
the Stahl case, <?.-. • Wills at 1 6 (quoting Stahl at 482). 
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claim to the Attorney General at the Heber Wells Building, which is not the office 
where the Attorney General resides. Id. at f 8. The State argued that the purpose of 
the Act was to "maximize efficiency of claim processing by limiting the delivery of 
notices to one location." Id. at If5. Further, the State argued that in order to effectuate 
this purpose, "[s]uch efficiency . . . can be achieved only by interpreting the Act to 
mandate that the notice of claim be directed and delivered to the attorney general 
himself at the location in which he keeps a desk and chair." Id. Rejecting the State's 
argument, the Supreme Court held that this interpretation of the Act is "too narrow, 
and its view of the meaning of the 'direct and deliver' to be too restrictive." Id. 
Despite the trial court's ruling, in this case the purpose of the Act is broad. In 
Wills, it appears that the Supreme Court has focused on the issue of investigation and 
settlement of claims to compensate victims. For the purposes of this case, the primary 
focus is the issue of whether the notice of claim gave the State an opportunity to 
conduct an investigation. The purpose is not to simply to remedy the condition as the 
State has argued. Because the notice in this case provided the State information about 
the claim, the State had the tools necessary to conduct an investigation. Therefore, 
based on the information contained in the notice of claim, if the State had conducted a 
"proper and timely investigation," it would have been clear where exactly the accident 
occurred. Holding that the notice of claim must have the exact address of where the 
accident occurred is contrary to the purpose and objective of the Act, contrary to the 
plain language of the Act, and too narrow a reading of the requirements of the Act. 
Accordingly, this Court should alternatively hold that due to the ambiguities and lack 
18 
of clear" 'requirements, Plaintiff s notice proper and,, congruent with the purpose and 
objective of fa 
C ~1JE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING l\). )NSIDER 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WH H1111 k 
PLAINT™7'*2 MOTirp OF CT V \ I WAS PROI' * 
The Di* 
determine whether Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable; or, whether the notice it 
was congruent w ith the purpose and objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
/ iillv I'OIHI'IIH J willi (In \i I I -I ittlciiiiitie ilThe null, H 
of claim has sufficient facts "'to afford the responsible public authorities an 
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a chain-/~ 
ir liiiurmationinthenoiu^ ... ... ..,* .. ;r» 
r^* xJc enough information to conduct a meaningful investigation, )')' )i i • >• M '"'f«'» 
(quotingStahl at •' ^ 
In I Nluili lln (HCiloiiiiiiiaiil position Liken lb1, appellate courts is Unit "[ajctual 
notice does not cure a party's failure to meet" the requ irements of lln* \ e I V 
f 19, Stated another way, * in the absence of some ambitzt -t e appellate court] ,\ ill 
mill fli lurh r\||iilihnit legislative requirements and read i..^ ... statute an actual notice 
exception." Greene v. Utah TransitAuth " ' ' ' '<» 1|l l ? P M " l " ' > 
motion hearing, Plaintiff argued that extrinsic evidence needed to be considered by 
the coin I to determine whether Hamuli's notice was reasonable and congruent with 
tin* purpose ami ob|eelhe mil Hie \i i i« II in mi I |i in X nne i m mi \ i \ i liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
objection, the trial court held that extrinsic evidence would not be considered. R. at 
80. 
Although no court in Utah has explicitly stated that extrinsic evidence shall be 
considered when a court must determine whether a notice was proper, there is at least 
one case that appears to have considered such evidence. The case is Nunez v. Albo, 
2002 UT App 247. In Nunez, the issue was whether the notice of claim, as filed with 
the State Attorney General and served on the physician, provided sufficient notice of 
possible claim against the University of Utah. See, Id. at \25-27. Holding that the 
notice was proper, the court cited and relied on the fact that, in response to Nunez's 
notice of claim, "Dr. Albo forwarded a copy of the notice of claim to the University's 
Risk Management. In response, Risk Management wrote to Ms. Nunez 
acknowledging that Dr. Albo was 'an employee of the University of Utah... 
represented by counsel,' and asked that all communications concerning this matter be 
directed either to Risk Management or to Dr. Albo's counsel of record." Nunez at 
f 26. After citing the fact that the University of Utah had responded to the notice of 
claim, the Nunez court stated that "[c]learly the University was put on notice of Ms. 
Nunez's claim and recognized its potential liability for Dr. Albo's treatment." Id. at 
f 27. Although it is not clearly stated, the Nunez opinion implicitly relies on the 
extrinsic evidence regarding how the State responded to the notice. The court 
specifically stated that "[bjased on this notice, the University was free to investigate 
the merits of the claim and 'arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate.' Thus, 
20 
although the University was not specifically named, the purpose of the Immunity 
-Ai T i iiiitii i I I iiiim "i \dii lulfilled.1 ' Id, (quoting/). . - ). 
In this case, as in the Nunez ease *'• • ! 
to determine \\ hether the notice was propei V\" 111 1 11 1 11inning w hat the State ^^ 
h • -,H.|:M J the notice, it i,s nupu:>t>il>li: to determine if the notice was sufficient to 
allow" the State to conduct and invrstifalmn lni e^ n iiipli , I (In" |nii[n)si nil 111« 
"statement of facts" section is to provide the State enough information to conduct an 
in i 'cstigation, the court shwuki ^Mi.^ vki what the investigation uncovered befoic 
ruling thatthe infonr..r^on in thf* • • • e: ..;,:< -
ambiguity in the statute, this need is h }j«jt lighted due to the disadvantage the Plaintiff 
Itas in determining wii.«i - -~,uu^< - \ the statute Because the statute in *hh ease 
is complete' * *.-'*• • — * *5 
needed, the determination of whether the State was able to conduct an investigation is 
imperative. Moreover, even in the context of the strict compliance standard, this 
( Yniil >ln iiliil Hisiiin llir i vtiniMi rvidukv heuiusc nl die ainbiguil) ol the statute. 
Therefore, where there is ambiguity in the Ac * *he consider;*-
evidence is necessary to determine if tne notice of el.:tm ^ as reasonable in iuht of the 
amln^uilv, -n, vvhdlin si pn vidrd .'Him l^i mb- . *n to conduct an investigation: or, 
whether Plaintiff strictly complied. This Court should reverse f In' 1 n„11 rniiil's 
decision and hold that Plaintiffs notice was proper. In the alternative , this cour t 
)ui t to determine if the State was able to conduct 
an investigation based on the notin; and disrMwi <hr inra'1')' ' 'h accident 
However, remanding the case may be futile because, assuming Risk Management 
conducted the investigation, a cursory review of their own files would show they had 
letters from Plaintiffs counsel and medical records explicitly listing the address of the 
accident, therefore, fulfilling the purpose and objective of the Act. R. at 51, 52-4, and 
55-8. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff maintains that she did, in fact, strictly comply with the requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunities Act. In the alternative, Plaintiffs notice was 
reasonable and congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. Finally, it was 
improper for the trial court not to consider extrinsic evidence to determine if Plaintiff 
strictly complied, whether the notice was reasonable in light of the ambiguities in the 
Act, or whether the notice was congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q day of December, 2003. 
Siegfried & Jensen 
Brock A. Van de Kamp 
Dustin Lance 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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Barry Lawrence 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant, State ol" 1, Itah 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND L< >R 




ri H L STA I L Ol- U IAJ1 and MAGNA 
INVESTMENTS & DFVF1 OPM FNT 
limited partnership, 
ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 





^ L i H i i i n * - -M.*> case arises out of a >up ar.ii iall acckient that occur red 
on D e c e m b e r 5, 2001.,, ii i front of a I Jtah State I •iqi lor Store (the " Occident") I Maintiff filed a 
Notice of Claim on September 18, 2002, relating to the Accident, and on Januaiy 8, 2003, filed a 
( Ol) | ,;<!„ a! l u u i m e i K v.'aLiauiM AhiL'i: 
Store.) On January 22, 2003, the State responded with a Motion to Dismiss (along with a 
provision (Utah Code Ann fc 6 \-*sii-l 1 i of the Utah Goxernmrntal ImmurriU \rt i\ Mah < *ndc 
Ann. >sG^-.v-i.v- sett ith<jVw.i >• - lading to pn-tdw ..^ io.aipjiiuii;., \ ^ i u , n i, i^ -" 
Notice. On tebruai \ ] ] ''< *( pv plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's Motion. 
The State then filed a reply memorandum in support of its Motion on February 25, 2003, On 
M;n L\Jln«11 \\\ " ! n<! ;j \\ \\ h. MMII;1, IUMI, ,'I,I, ,/ , i, (!) Sf;ifr\ MHtnn H;if«-fi hn\r"ii<' 
Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of Utah; Brock Van de Kamp of 
^icg-n-ju -v .: j.i.^i. jpp-a.^. . ... 'lant, ' /\ allace, Ch ristensen & 
Kanell, was also present on bchal*'of Magna Investments & Development. 
Ruling on the Motion (o Dssnu^. i he Stale oi Utah argued that the plaintiff 5s claims 
.i!>ain-• • ••-. •-. !- • l- ' " *-..vanse plaintiffs Notice oi Claim failed to identify the 
location of the Accident. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) only required that a 
Notice • :)f Claim contain a "<:;;bi ief staten lent of facts" and did i lot expressly require the location of 
the Accident. At the conclusion of the oral argument, and having considered the pleadings and 
submissions of tl le par ties, and the ai gut nent of coi msel, the Com t gi a nted the State'' s I \ loti- :>i I to 
Dismiss. 
The Court specifically rules as follows: 
2 
*-* 
For purposes of the State's Motion, this < 'nnrl holds llli.il lllic folium inj» fm Is, tilt ii 
from plaintiffs Complaint and Notice of Claim,, are not in dispute: 
front of a Utah State Liquor Store. 
a::itiff filed a Notice oi Llaim on Septemhc; i *v JoO.:. , Jating h> AK Aa uk nt 
-,. i^ i that Notice of Claim, plaintiff provided the following statement concerning the 
Accident: 
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor Store on 
ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed 
rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, ra'her than underneath it. 
' I he nextpaiagr.i.; . ' . . - • * • -v.- *. ••. ., •., . i i^v.-.e 
paragraph describes plaintiffs alleged damages. 
:w- \ . -.. .• oi * .aiiii.iii! not !dciiti!> at \-.MV -. u... M.UC • iquor Store the Accident 
occurred. 
For purposes of the State's Motion to Dismiss, this Court makes the following 
emu i - law: 
lah L ode Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) of the Act required claimant to have included a 
"b! •' *:.Men .. • 'Is" Ri.iliiij" Iiu Hit At t itltiil lit hii Nulni nil htm. 
he Act does not explicitly idcntifv which facts are to be included; accordingly, this 
Court :-ais; iuoK U: ;;,c purpose oi Uw AJI \o victu-mme \\ hat iaci> should be included in a Notice 
of Claim. 
3 
"" Ii ::! 
3. According to the Utah Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to provide 
the State with "an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury", and to "evaluate 
the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete 
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 
1999). 
4. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, this Court concludes that 
the Notice of Claim, in a slip and fall case such as this, must identify the location of the accident. 
In this case, claimant should have provided the address of the liquor store at issue; her reference 
to an unidentified Utah State Liquor store did not provide the State with the location of the 
Accident. 
5. Therefore, the claimant failed to comply with the Notice of Claim provision of the 
Act, and so this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against the State. 
Accordingly, the State of Utah should be dismissed from this case. 
6. The Court further concludes that although the State may have had actual notice of the 
location of the Accident from other correspondence sent by plaintiffs counsel, the court will 
not consider such extrinsic evidence because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to 
comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 42 
P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
4 
2. Plaintiffs claims against the State asserted herein are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. This Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiff and the State of Utah. 
Further, because the issue involved on this motion (i.e., governmental immunity) is unique to the 
State, there is no just reason for delaying the conclusion of this matter. Accordingly, this Court 
directs that Final Judgment be entered in this matter in favor of the State of Utah pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 54(b). 




Brock Van de Kamp, 8907 
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Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 266-0999 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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& Magna development, a limited partnership, 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case NO. 030900399 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
-000O000-
Noticeis hereby given thatPlaintiff and Appellant, DelonePeeples, through counsel, appeals to the 
Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of Timothy R. Hanson dismissing the State of Utah, entered on this 
matter on May 27,2003. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment dismissing the State of Utah. A 
transcript of the motion hearing has been ordered but not received. 
DATED this / 3 day of June, 2003. 
Brock Van de Kamp 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11^/) day of June 2003,1 caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following counsel of record: 
Barry Lawrence 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant, State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8056 
Terry M. Plant 
Plant, Wallace, Christansen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MITCHELL R J E N S E N * 
PRESTON L. HANDY 
MATTHEW J . STOREY 
OF COUNSEL 
M I C H A E L F. R I C H M A N * 
M I C H A E L A. KATZ 
A. J O H N WITKOWSKI* 
B A R B A R A L. TOWNSEND' 
BARRY K. MILLER 
•A*-SP ADMITTED tN CAUrORNIA 
•ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
Utah State Risk Management 
ATTN: Claims Adjuster 
5120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Our Client: 
Your Insured: 
Location: 
Date Of Loss: 
Dear Claims Adjuster: 
This office has been retained to represent Delone Peeples in connection with a slip and fall 
incident that occurred outside the Cottonwood Plaza, State Of Utah Liquor Store located at 1863 
East 7000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Ms. Peeples fell on ice on the sidewalk to the store that had 
accumulated due to the rain gutter draining across the sidewalk. 
As a result of this fall, Delone has sustained multiple injuries. I would appreciate it if you 
would send me a copy of the declaration page of your insurance policy verifying the coverages 
available under their policy. 
Please direct all questions and correspondence regarding this claim to my attention. Should 
you have any questions, in connection with this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me or my 
assistant, Stephanie Mash. 
Very truly yours, 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Mitchell R Jensten 
MRJ:sm V _ ^ 
cc: Regular Mail 
LAW OFFICES OF 
SIEGFBIED & JENSEN 
56B4 SOUTH GREEN STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH: 64123 
TELEPHONE: (SOI) 2 6 6 - 0 9 9 9 
FAX: (SO!) 2 6 6 - 1 3 3 6 
PROVO 
3 7 5 - 0 9 9 9 
OGDEN 
3 9 9 - 0 9 9 9 
March 12,2002 
LEGAL ASSISTANTS 
BRYANT E. HANSON 
S T E P H A N I E MASH 
BETTY M. CUMMOCK 
TAMMARA SHEPARD 
R U B E N MARTINEZ 




J I L L H A N S E N 
CARLOS OJEDA 
BETTY JEAN HUTKIN 
C INDY DISRAELI 





Utah State Liquor Store 
1863 East 7000 South, SLC, Utah 
December 5, 2001 
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MICHAEL F. R I C H M A N * 
JAMES W. GILSON 
•ALSO ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA 
LAW OFFICES OF 
S I E G F R I E D & J E N S E N 
5 6 6 4 SOUTH GREEN STREET 
MURRAY, TJTAH: 84123 
TELEPHONE: (SOU 2 6 6 - 0 9 9 9 
FAX: {SOU 2 6 6 - 1 3 3 8 
PROVO 
3 7 5 - 0 9 9 9 
OGDEN 
3 9 9 - 0 9 9 9 
J u n e 17, 2002 
J i m Sefandonakis 
UTAH STATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
5120 State Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Our Client: 
Your Insured: 
Claim Number: 
Date of Loss: 
Delone Peeples 
Utah State Liquor Store 
Unknown 
December 5, 2001 
LEGAL ASSISTANTS 
BRYANT E. HANSON 
S T E P H A N I E MASH 




R U B E N MARTINEZ 




J ILL H A N S E N 
CARLOS OJEDA 





Dear Mr. Sefandonakis : 
Enclosed with this letter is a b rochure outl ining Delone Peeple's in jur ies . 
Delone fell in front of the Utah State Liquor Store on ice which was al lowed to 
accumula te on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed rain gutter t ha t d ra ins onto t h e top 
of the side walk ra ther t han undernea th it. (I have enclosed photos of the scene for your 
review) It is also clear t ha t the t enan t failed to take adequa te m e a s u r e s of ice removal , 
especially considering the facts which would p u t them on notice of th i s p e r m a n e n t 
dange rous condition. 
Paramedics were called to the scene and t r anspor t ed Delone to St. Mark 's 
Hospital . X-rays and other diagnostic s tudies revealed mult iple hip fractures . Delone 
a l so sus t a ined mult iple contus ions and abras ions to her left leg, left ankle , back , left 
shou lder a n d left arm. She was admit ted to the hospital for inpa t ien t care a n d pain 
m a n a g e m e n t . 
On December 9, 2001 Delone was moved to Heal thsouth Rehabil i tat ion for 
physical therapy. While there , she developed severe low back pa in which r e n d e r e d her 
u n a b l e to walk. She was then transferred back to St. Mark's Hospital where tes t ing 
showed t h a t Delone was suffering from modera te central spinal s tenos is and m o d e r a t e 
lateral recess stenosis at L3 to L5. The L4 to L5 disc levels showed modera te left n e u r a l 
foraminal narrowing and a broad-based lateral bulge with advanced multilevel 
degenerative spondylosis and bilateral sacral insufficiency f ractures . Pelvis d iagnost ics 
showed bilateral sacral insufficiency fractures and a h e m a t o m a along the left sciatic 
nerve, and a comminuted left posterior superior pubic r a m u s fracture tha t ex tends down 
to the junc t ion of the inferior ischium pubis , and a nondisp laced fracture of t h e right 
pubic ischium junct ion. Delone was started on a morphine PCA p u m p for pa in control , 
a n d a course of occupat ional therapy and physical therapy. She was re leased on 
J a n u a r y 16. 2002. 
Jim Sefandonakis 
UTAH RISK MANAGEMENT 
June 17, 2002 
Page 2 
Delone was inpatient in the hospital for over 40 days. She remained under 
sedation and medication which interfered with her eating, bowel and bladder function. 
Now she has to wear adult diapers which she did not have to wear prior to the fall. 
Since her release Delone has worked diligently to return to the same level 
of activity she enjoyed before the fall. Despite her efforts, she has fallen far short of her 
pre-accident state of health. In fact, she is jus t now beginning to walk. Her mental 
sharpness and focus are reduced from continued stress and use of multiple medications. 
Her pain is chronic and requires ongoing medication. She has lost over 251bs. She 
pushes herself to eat, but can't keep most food down. She lives on the drink "ensure" to 
give her nourishment. She relies on her family to perform most tasks such as cleaning, 
preparing meals, shopping and other necessary daily tasks. 
Delone cannot drive nor pick up and hold her great-grandchildren. She has 
trouble writing because of numbness in the fingers on her right hand. Her right shoulder 
was bruised severely and consequently still gives her ongoing pain which affects her 
ability to clean, cook, etc. 
Prior to her fall, Delone was the primary care giver for her husband Richard 
of 59 years who suffers from chronic back problems, requiring assistance and use of a 
walker. Delone did all of the heavy house work and kept him comfortable. She would 
get his prescriptions, do the shopping, the cleaning, get him books at the library and get 
him out every day to walk the mall for exercise. As a result of Delone's inability to care 
for Richard, his condition has worsened to the point of requiring that he be hospitalized. 
Consequently, both Delone and Richard spent the holidays at St. Mark's Hospital. 
Prior to the fall, Delone was a very active person for her age. She was quick 
whitted and the life of every family gathering. She was proud of her appearance and 
would rise early each day and get herself "put together" before going go to the senior 
center to-exercise class. 
As you can tell from this letter and the letter from her daughter, Diane 
Kamp, the injuries Delone sustained in this fall have been a major set back both 
physically and mentally for her and her husband. She is very frustrated with her 
limitations as she has always been able to care for herself and Richard. But now because 
of her weakened condition and ongoing pain, she does not have the strength to do what 
she once did. 
Jim SefandonaMs 
UTAH RISK MANAGEMENT 
J u n e 17,2002 
Page 3 
As part of the enclosed brochure, I have attached and labeled the letter that 
I received from Delone's daughter, Diane Kamp, describing her mother's abilities before 
and after the fall. I have also enclosed information from Merry Maids, and Brighton 
Gardens Of Salt Lake City, an assisted living care facility. Dr. Robert Powell's report 
addresses the need for domestic help and the likely need for Delone to be placed in an 
assisted care facility. 
We would appreciate your timely evaluation of this claim and response to 
the enclosed demand. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this claim, please 
feel free to contact me or my Legal Assistant, Stephanie Mash. 
Sincerely, 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
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M^J^tlstjM-
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IMEDICATIOM HISTORY 
\^o\(k .toPS"t&tft*toho + . 
l^/fO CMUlk 
ASSESS' 
AW • fr*m, [{; ?w>, vi^fsi 
COMM HOSP J3U£- ni^HV 
fiA- t K ^ tfT>fp4 ^MJ;, Tr*y^\ 
ie undersigned, understand that I am financially responsible for all charges and request that payment of authorized benefitsl)e made on my behalf to Gold 
ss Sei vices Inc /d b a Gold Ci oss Ambulance for any ambulance services provided I authoi ize any holder of medical information or documentation about me 
Please to the Health Care Financing Administration, HCFA, and its agents or other insurance carneis, as well as to Gold Cross Services, Inc 16 b a Gold Cross 
bulaope, any information oudocumentanon needed to determine these benefits or benefits payable for related services ptovided now or in the future I 
l3i?tancMI>di a seivice charge of 1 1/2% per month \18% APR) will be chaiged on all accounts over 30 days, with a minimum charge of fifty cents per month 
•i .-.ildua 
H or Rc oponLible Party Signature if rafflent is a Minor or is unable lo sign 
i-(;.'.^ i';Ol bce-i of^.re,j asseacrv^ra and evaluation, arnargeucy Ueatrnera. and ambulance iranspoiiauon, i /crluse: 
CHECK ALL REASONS THAT APPLY 
( ) assessment and evaluation, 
( ) emergency treatment, 
( ) ambulance transportation., 
ihai lias been offered to me or my child or ward. I, the undersigned, do hereby release ti~\e above indicated agency(s) and their 
personnel Uoiri any and all further responsibility to the below mentioned patient and agree to consult a physician of my own choice, ir 
h-js been clearly axpiaineci to me Hie possible consequences of my refusal. 
Siqnc ! or Legal Guardian 
Signature of Wil.nass fif patent refuses ro sign) 
{ ) Patient, Parent or Legal Guardian refuses to sign 
release after refusing services as cheeked above. 
(swsss&BMawsswasKtiaisKisa 
H4< -E:_l n 1 LPl. 
IENTNAME: 
EQUIPMENT USED LIST 
RUN NO. . < H - * 7 S " * I _ UNIT NO.. tu 
0 d*n. P^Us 
LiST QUANTITIES USED OR REPLACED ON THE ABOVE PATIENT. 
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - KERI.IX 
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS • TRIANGLE 
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - 4X1 
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS • 8X10 
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - 5X9 
BANPAGESORLSSJ^S • VASELINE GAUZE 
BED PANS (FRACTURE RAN) 
BITE STICK 
BODY BAG - DISPOSABLE 
BULB SYRINGE 
„ C COLt AR - BABY NO-NECK 
C COLLAR - PEDIATRIC 
C COLLAR PERFIT ACE 
L._.. EKG PADS, PED. 3/PK 
EKG PADS ADULT 4/PK 
EKG - QUIK-COMBO REG. - ADULT 








IV - INTROCAN CATH. -14 
IV - INTROCAN OATH. • 16 
IV-INTROCAN CATH.-18 
IV - INTROCAN CATH. - 20 
IV - INTROCAN CATH. - 22 
iV - INTROCAN CATH. - 24 
._ IV - ARM BOARD - LONG 
...... IV - ARM BOARD - SHORT 
IV-D5W 500 ML/SAG 
IV - D5W 500 ML/VENTED (GLASS) 
. IV - EXTENSION SET 
IV - INTRA OSSEOUS NEEDLE 
IV - NEEDLE LOCK DEVICE 
IV - NORMAL SALINE 9%. 500 ML 
IV - NORMAL SALINE 9^ , 1.000 ML 
IV - PRESSURE BAG, DISR 500 ML. 
IV • PRESSURE BAG, DSSR L000 ML 
IV - PUMP REQUIRED 
IV • PUMP SET • REG. 













































IV - RINGERS, 500 ML 
„ _ IV-RINGERS. 1.000 ML 
IV - SET • BLOOD 
..._ IV - SET • BURETROL 
_.„ IV - SET - PEDIATRIC 
IV - SET • REGULAR 
IV-START PACK 
...... iV-STOP COCK 
MED - ACTIVATED CHARCOAL, 25 ML 
..„ MED-ADENOCARD12MG 
MED-ALBUTEROL 
MED - ATROPINE SULFATE 
__..MED-BABY.ASPIRIN 
_.. MED - BENADRYL 
. _ MED - CA GLUCONATE 
___. MED - DEMEROL TUBEX 50 MG 
___ MED - DEMEROL TUBEX 100 MG 
__ MED • DEXTROSE 50% 25 MG 
MED - DOaLTAMiHE 250 MG/20 ML VIAL. 
__ MED - DOPAMINE 400 MG 
„ „ MED -EPINEPHRINE 1/1.000 
........ MED - EPINEPHRINE 1 /10,000 
MED-GLUCAGON IMG VIAL 
„._. MED - GLUT08E 
MED-HEP-LOCK 10UNITS 
MED-HEP-LOCK 100 UNITS 
_._. MED-LASIX 100MG/10CC 
MED - LIDOCAINE 0.4% BAG 500 ML 
_ „ MED-LIDOCAINE 100 MG 
_.._ MED - LIDOCAINE JELLY 
__ MED - MAGNESIUM SULFATE 5GM 
.__ MED - MORPHINE SULFATE 10 MG 
___. MED - NARCAN 2MG/CC 
MED - NITROGLYCERIN 50 MG/10ML 
MED - NITROR^STE 2% 30GM TUBE 
MED - NITRQSTAT .4 MG 
MED - NORMAL SALINE 10/ML VIAL 
MED -PHENERGAN 
MED - FiTOGIN 10 UNITS 
MED- PROCAINAMIDE iGM^OMLVIAi. 
MED •• SODIUM BICARBONATE ADULT 
MED - SODIUM BICARBONATE PEDIATRIC 
_.. MED-THIAMINE 100 MG VIAL 













































MED-VALIUM 10 MQ 
MED - VERAPAMIL 5MG/2ML 
NO. TUBE 
NEEDLESS HYPODERMIC #18 
NEEDLES. HYPODERMIC £20 
NEEDLES. HYPODERMIC #22 
O.B. KIT 
02 - AIRWAY - ADULT 
02 - AIRWAY - CHILD 
02 - AIRWAY - INFANT 
02 - BAAM AiRWAf MONITOR 
02 - BAG VALVE MASK, DISP. ADULT 
02 - BAG VALVE MASK, DiSP. INFANT 
02 - CANNULA - ADULT 
02 - CANNULA - PEDIATRIC 
02 - DiSP. HUMIDIFER 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 3.0 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 4.G 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL. TUBE - 5.0 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 5.5 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 5.0 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 6.5 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 7.0 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 7.5 
02 -ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE -8.0 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 8.5 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUSE HOLDER, ADULT 
02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE HOLDER. PED 
02 - ENRICHMENT A3SBY. 
02 - ESOPHAGEAL OBTURATOR AIRWAY 
02 - EXTENSION TUBING 
02- MASK-ADULT NONBREATHER 
02 - MASK Hi CONG PEDIATRIC 
02 - NASOPH. AIRWAY FR 
02 - NEBULIZER 
02 - NEBULIZER BEAR 
02-COMP. AIR LTRS. 
02-P/HR. ._LTRS. 
02 - PEEP VALVE 
02 - POCKET MASK 
02 -TRACK MASK 
02 - TUBE CHECK 
02 - VENTILATOR CIRCUIT DiSP 


































... SCALPEL - DISPOSABLE 
... SPECIAL HANDLING (EXPLAIN) 
... SPLINT CABDBARD - HAND 
... SPLINT CARDBARD - LEG 
... SPLINTING MAl'ERiALS (EXPLAIN) 
. STERILE WATER 
... STYLETTES FR 
_ SUCTION-CANNISTER, DISP. 
..SUCTION-CARTRIDGE^VAC 
.. SUCTION • EXTENSION TUBING 
.. SUCTION - FLEX. CATH _._FR 
.. SUCTION - MECONIUM ASPIRATOR 
... SUCTION - YAUNKERS 
. SYRINGES - ICC 
.. SYRINGES-3CC 
... SYRINGES - 5CC 
.SYRINGES- I0CC 
.. SYRINGES - G0CC CATH. TIP 
.. SYRINGES - LUERLOCK 60 CC 
_ THERMOMETER COVER ' 
_ TRANSPORT TEAM PICK-UP/RTN 
. URINAL 
. VACUTAINER HOLDER 
. VACUTAINER LUER ADAPTER 
. VACUTAINER TUBE - BLUE 
. VACUTAINER TUBE - GRAY 
.. VACUTAINER TUBE - LAVENDER 
.. VACUTAINER TUBE - RED 
. VACUTAINER TUBE - TIGER 
. EXTRA ATTENDANT (EXPLAIN) 
EXTENSIVE CLEANING (EXPLAIN) 
RESPOND/EVALUATE (NO TRANSPORT) 
.WAITING TIME IN EXCESS OF 
/ 
. 30 MINUTES (EXPLAIN) 
(e>uy K* 
£-£ 
lNairie *- ' -V L/f^y. 
_L f\A.J ii Agei.„y Incident # O{-b'<>0^ PRIMARY CONDITION CODE LIST (check all that apply) 
abdominal pain 
Jtered state of consciousness, (weak, dizzy, lethargic, semi-
onscious, etc.) 
)hest pain / angina 
rVA or possible CVA 
difficulty breathing 
ull cardiac arrest 
[yperglycemia 









Respiratory arrest/ failure 
Seizures 
Shock 
Syncopal episode / fainting 
Trauma (any injury or pain to any body part) 




SECONDARY CONDITION CODE LIST (check all that apply) 






















D Decubitus ulcers 
• Dehydration 




• Limited range of movement 
D Malaise / fatigue 
D Nosebleed 
D Paralysis 




• Sickle cell crisis 
ABDOMINAL / PREGNANCY 
D Pregnancy complications 
D Labor pains / contractions 
• Premature birth 
D Obstetric delivery (term) 
D Miscarriage 
D Toxemia 
D Vaginal bleeding 
D i Glbteeding-
• Pancreatitis 
insported for higher level of care D 
insported for x-ray / cat scan, etc. D^ 
insported for heart catheterization D 
























Combative / aggressive 





>J / INJURIES / ILLNESSES 
Burns 
Injured in fall 
Injured in auto accident 
Injured in fight / brawl 
Injured in rape 









Extremity injury, (site) 
REASON FOR TRANSPORT 
Transported for PEG tube replacement D 
Neonatal transport • 
Transported for dialysis D 
Transported for radiation therapy 











Gun shot wound 
Stabbing / cutting wound 
Laceration/abrasion(site) 
Cancer (site) 
PEG tube complications 
0 tube complications 
Shunt / cath complications 
Dialysis 
Renal failure 
TES / EXPLANATION: 
Transported for surgery 
Transport home / SNF / ECF 
This is an interfacility transfer, 
Yes ,No . 
OTHER REASONS FOR TRANSPORT (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY) 
is transported in an EMERGENCY SITUATION, e g., accident, 
jry or acute illness. 
&iod to be restrained, 
ysical , Verbal , Medication . 
is unconscious or in shock 
quired oxygen or other emergency treatment on way to the 
Jinahon 




Had to remain immobile because of a fracture or the possibility of a 
fracture 
Was bed confined? Yes , No . 
Explain" 
Could only be moved by stretcher9 
Explain 
Yes No 
* intcrtadMY «i*eckca«ons oode^d try r«<errw%o o h y s o a 
Aug P R Q C E O U R E S . ( c h t c k «u m a t «ppt Y ) 
M jaua( dc6bnttai>oo f ctrd+ovcraoo 
E/vfrrtrxivca* Wrtubatioo 
lCncsKicoompce^SiOfv 
Ccotngt VCOCKII fcre 
I S^fQ4C3< >*n*ay 
C>oJ<ac pfrdog 
I Intraosseous l«oc S 
fYPE C * A S S E S S M E N T P E R P O R M E C X «< H S ~«~» 
€ i / E « C € H C Y ? , . . / , 
TabF 
NED P S I E G F R I E D 
MITCHELL R. J E N S E N * 
PRESTON L. HANDY 
MATTHEW J . STOREY 




MICHAEL F. R I C H M A N * 
J A M E S W. G ILSON 
•ALSO ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA 
LAW OFFICES OF 
SIEGFRIED & J E N S E N 
S 6 6 4 SOUTH GREEN STREET 
MXJEHAY, UTAH: 84123 
TELEPHONE: {SOU 2 6 6 - 0 3 9 9 
FAX' (SOI) 2 6 6 - 1 3 3 8 
PROVO 
3 7 5 - 0 9 9 9 
OGDEN 
3 9 9 - 0 9 9 9 
September 18,2002 
LEGAL ASSISTANTS 
BRYANT E HANSON 
S T E P H A N I E MASH 
BETTY M CUMMOCK 
G R E G MALONE 
G E O R G E SERGAKIS 
TAMMARA SHEPARD 
R U B E N MARTINEZ 




J I L L H A N S E N 
CARLOS OJEDA 
BETTY J E A N HUTKIN 
C INDY DISRAELI 
C H R I S OGURA 
STACEY BEALS 
MINDY SWENSON 
UTAH STATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Attn: Jim Sefandonakis 
5120 South Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Salt Lake County Recorder 
2001 South State Street, Suite N-1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1150 
Re: Our Client: 
Your Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Delone Peeples 
Utah State Liquor Store 
December 5, 2001 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Delone Peeples, by and through her attorney of record, Dustin Lance of 
Siegfried & Jensen, does hereby give Notice of Claim against the State of Utah, 
pursuant to U.C.A. §63-30-11, for injuries she sustained and damages incurred. 
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor 
Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly 
designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than 
underneath it. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Re: Delone Peeples 
September 18, 2002 
Page Two 
Liability is clear in this case. The State of Utah was negligent, in among 
things, failing to take adequate measures of ice removal, especially considering 
the facts which would put them on notice of this dangerous condition. 
Due to the negligence of the State of Utah, Delone Peeples sustained 
serious injuries, including, but not limited to, multiple hip fractures, multiple 
contusions and abrasions to her left leg, left ankle, back, left shoulder and left 
arm pain. Ms. Peeples has undergone treatment for her injuries and will continue 
to undergo treatment and therefore has and will continue to incur medical 
expenses in connection with this incident. Delone Peeples claims damages 
related to the injuries sustained in the incident, including damages for any 
permanent impairment she may have suffered. All of these damage 
components, including any others discovered as this matter proceeds, need to be 
addressed. 
Based on the above, Delone Peeples gives notice of her claim for 
damages against the State of Utah. 
DATED this [Lj day of September, 2002. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
v«*«s— 
Dustin Lance 
Attorney for Claimant 
DLwh 
^ 
# _ 
